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In this article, I address structural discrimination, an under-represented area 
of study in Danish research. In particular, I introduce the concepts of micro-
discrimination and benevolent discrimination. These are proposed as two ways 
of articulating particular and opaque forms of structural racial discrimination, 
which have become normalised in everyday Danish (and other) contexts. I 
present and discuss discrimination as it surfaces in data from my empirical 
studies of discrimination in Nordic (Danish) contexts. These studies underscore 
how everyday assumptions and norms contribute to discriminatory practices 
in particular ways. The article, in introducing the terms micro-discrimination 
and benevolent discrimination, hopes to identify and acknowledge attitudes 
and behaviours that fall outside the purview of everyday understandings of 
discrimination and racism. In addition, it is my hope that these terms can 
be of use with regard to addressing and reducing challenges within anti-
discrimination and social exclusion frameworks.
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Introduction
‘God save us from people who mean well.’
A Suitable Boy, Vikram Seth
Discrimination and racism are often assumed to result from ill will. 
This, however, is not always the case. Racial discrimination can also 
occur inadvertently, for instance, as everyday racism, colour-blind 
racism as well as normalised and cultural racism (Bonilla-Silva 2010; 
Essed 1991; Gullestad 2005; Hervik 2004; Kamali 2009; Kilomba 
2013). Despite positive intent, or lack of animosity, discriminatory 
messages and positions may still negatively impact targets.
My focus in this article is on structural discrimination. This less-
studied area of Danish discrimination research refers to discursive 
and normalised discrimination that informs other, more explicit and 
particular forms and expressions of discrimination. I suggest that the 
inclusion of this historically embedded understanding of discrimination 
can supplement and help to further nuance discussions of racism 
and discrimination.
In particular, I am interested in subtle, overlooked or difficult-
to-identify discrimination. The exclusion under scrutiny here occurs 
in situations that are not necessarily antagonistic. As such, these 
present a paradox in which ordinary, seemingly neutral interactions 
and everyday exchanges can be conduits of discrimination. As such, 
even friendly exchanges may, in such instances, incur ostracism. 
When discrimination remains concealed or occurs in discrete, 
unintentional ways, it gives rise to a number of challenges, such as 
the difficulty in identification and acknowledgement of discrimination 
when it is subtle rather than explicit.
In this article, I identify and define some of these opaque 
expressions of discrimination. In particular, I present two ways in 
which structural discrimination is expressed. I define these as micro-
discrimination and benevolent discrimination. Micro-discrimination 
describes discrimination masked within micro-interactions. 
Benevolent discrimination resides within positive and well-meaning 
gestures, yet it belies a charitable relational dynamic that rests on 
powered assumptions about difference informed by colonial dynamics 
and residue.
I structure the article as follows: I begin with a presentation of 
my empirical study and methodology. Thereafter follows a discussion 
of structural discrimination and terminology. Finally, I introduce the 
concepts of micro-discrimination and benevolent discrimination.
Received 16 October 2016; Accepted 2 September 2017
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Method
This article takes its point of departure in qualitative research 
conducted in Denmark between 2013 and 2016. The empirical 
material I draw on here consists of both interviews with racially 
minoritised Danes as well as reflection papers written by racially 
minoritised and majoritised Danish university students.
I conducted 18 qualitative, in-depth interviews with racially 
minoritised Danish university students and graduates in the 
Copenhagen area. This is a narrow group and, as such, one that 
provides a limited range of experience. The study, however, was 
not intended as a comprehensive documentation of discrimination. 
Rather, it was my hope to gain insight into particular experiences of 
discrimination within a fairly exclusive group. Subjects were initially 
recruited from within my own network. Thereafter, subsequent 
interviewees were referred by the first interviewees, a process also 
known as snowballing (Atkinson & Flint 2001). My interview subjects 
were highly educated and ranged in age from their early 20s to their 
early 40s. They had a wide range of educational backgrounds, from 
legal studies to business to fine-and-performing arts. After this, they 
were all asked the same questions. These covered areas such as 
social and educational experiences growing up and situations in 
which they felt that their visible difference influenced interactions in 
their everyday experiences. Most interviews were digitally recorded 
and transcribed, some only recorded and four were reconstructed 
after technical difficulties.
There were several considerations behind this choice of subjects. 
First, my research interest was primarily to explore particular ways 
in which discrimination occurs in everyday experiences. I was 
keen to understand how discrimination was understood and dealt 
with by minoritised as well as majoritised people who identify as 
Danish. With the exception of research on transnational adoption in 
Denmark (Myong 2009), highly educated, racially minoritised Danes 
are not widely described in literature on Danish racism and racial 
discrimination.
It should be noted that I have chosen to work with a simple division 
between racially minoritised or majoritised subjects in this study. What 
I mean by this is that I divide people into racialised minority or majority, 
despite the imprecision of such a notion. People who, e.g., present as 
white (or non-white) may have complex racial identities that do not 
match how they are perceived and racialised. They are rarely either 
majoritised or minoritised, but usually more complexly located. The 
fact that I study socially privileged individuals further emphasises 
the complexity of these categories. My choice to use the categories 
racially minoritised and majoritised reflects the immediate appearance 
and the social categorisation in response to this. This either/or division 
erases much individual complexity (as well as the precarious nature 
of racialising). It also reflects a widespread discriminatory gesture 
in which Danishness is conflated with whiteness (Gullestad 2004; 
Jensen 2012). In this study, I do not explore the nuances, paradoxes 
and complexities of identities embedded in such gestures; therefore, 
for the sake of clarity, I operate mainly with this binary framework to 
articulate the issues in focus here.
Second, European racism and discrimination are often explained 
or excused by deflecting the discussion to questions of integration and 
cultural/religious difference (Essed 1991; Gullestad 2004; Skadegård 
2014). Many have described this tendency, e.g. Bulmer and Solomos 
(2004), when they explain how ‘…the new racisms within the past 
two decades are coded within a cultural logic. As a result, the 
champions of these racisms can claim that they are protecting their 
way of life and that the issue of colour or phenotype is irrelevant’. As 
such, there may be a tendency to assume that those who are met 
with racial discrimination are also culturally different. Discrimination 
can thereby be understood and even legitimised in terms of cultural 
or religious difference. In the wake of such approaches, narratives of 
incompatibility with Danish norms and culture arise (Hervik 2004).
Third, challenges involving racialisation risk being framed as 
what Yilmaz has termed ‘the ethnification of social problems’ (Yilmaz 
1999). In order to avoid this, I wanted to speak with people of colour, 
who self-identified as Danes, grew up in middle-to-upper middle 
class Danish contexts and were immersed in a widely shared social 
frame of reference (language, schooling and social life). In this way, 
by choosing subjects of colour who identify as Danish, I hope to place 
skin tone (and religion) as secondary to context. The informants in 
this study are culturally Danish and socially positioned so as to avoid 
falling into neo-racist cultural or social explanations for experiences 
of social exclusion and discrimination (Hervik 2004; Urciuoli 2013; 
Yilmaz 1999).
In addition to interviews, I also used reflection papers, a method 
inspired by Trienekens and Essed (2008). I asked students in my 
master-level classes to write freestyle thoughts and reflections (from 
their own experiences) at the end of introductory class sessions 
on discrimination. This was an element of a teaching method used 
during courses on International Competence Development, Learning 
in Intercultural Contexts and Corporate Social Responsibility. Classes 
ranged from 11 students for most courses to some sessions with up 
to 80 students. Papers were ungraded and anonymized.
Students made it clear that they had not previously had class 
discussions, nor had they been exposed to any formal teaching, on 
discrimination until these sessions. The reflection papers were a way 
for students to privately deliberate, reflect and articulate as they saw 
fit in relation to the issues brought up in class. Although all of the 
students were required to deliver a reflection paper as part of the 
course work, they had the choice to allow the papers to be used for 
research. All students, without exception, gave permission.
All papers were anonymised. This meant that whether and how 
the author was racially minoritised or majoritised was not always 
apparent, and similarly, other identity parameters were not always 
delineated. Structural discrimination, as discussed later, is not limited 
to particular racialised positions. It is discernible within dominant and 
shared norms and in ordinary, everyday expressions and actions that 
can be expressed from minority as well as majority positions.
The empirical material was organised along themes as patterns 
emerged. These were identified in the form of key narratives and 
statements wherein subjects described similar experiences in regard 
to dilemmas such as a dissonance between discrimination and its 
denial, in descriptions of friendly interactions in which discriminatory 
messages were inferred or embedded and in descriptions of 
interchanges in which discriminatory assumptions or beliefs were 
shrouded within everyday language and practices.
My point of departure for the analysis (interviews and reflection 
papers) positions individual experience within a presumption that 
equal treatment and non-discrimination are expectations or shared 
norms. I also assume that these norms are challenged in individual 
experience. To explore this, I try to understand how broader social 
(macro) dynamics are inscribed in micro-processes and practices, 
which are (re)shaped in local contexts such as within described 
interactions with friends and peers, in educational settings and within 
families and other familiar spaces. As such, when scrutinising how 
individuals experience – and navigate in relation to – discrimination, 
subtle and underlying (and often-unintended) discrimination emerges, 
alongside categories of recognised or acknowledged discrimination. 
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In this social and discursive space, articulations of different implicit 
and explicit forms of discrimination arise.
In this course of research, two forms of structural discrimination, 
which I call benevolent discrimination and micro-discrimination, 
become apparent. These are subtle and underlying forms that 
are often simultaneously denied (or excused; interpreted as 
misunderstanding). These forms of discrimination often occur within 
friendly or non-antagonistic interactions.
What Is Structural Discrimination, Exactly…?
Interest in discrimination and racism in the Nordic countries has gained 
ground over recent years (Andreassen & Rabo 2014; Danbolt & Raun 
2008; Gullestad 2005; Hervik 2004; Justesen 2003; Keskinen 2012; 
Myong 2009; Rasmussen 2011; Reyes & Kamali 2005). Despite this, 
explorations of structural discrimination remain under-represented. 
Structural discrimination can be thought of as a broad or meta form 
of discrimination that is expressed within, or informs, tacit norms and 
understandings. As such, it underlies many types of explicit and implicit 
discrimination. Kamali (2009:6) describes how structural discrimination 
‘…legitimises and normalises indirect forms of negative treatment of 
the “Others” and makes it a part of everyday normal life of society’.
My perspective is inspired by and converges with, among others, 
Essed’s (1991) notion of everyday racism, Kilomba’s (2013) notion 
of structural discrimination as a privileging of whiteness which 
puts minorities at disadvantage and Sue’s (2010) development 
of racial microaggressions. All of these concern how what I call 
structural discrimination is echoed in practices and interactions. In 
other words, overt and covert discrimination emerge from shared 
discriminatory structures, norms, traditions and ways of thinking and 
understanding.
Further, my use of the term draws on legal and social studies (Hill 
1988; Kamali 2009; Pincus 1996), studies of structural and institutional 
discrimination and racism (SLR 1999; Reyes & Kamali 2005), as well 
as critical race theory (Crenshaw 1991; Delgado & Stefancic 1992). 
The term includes all the recognised discrimination grounds specified 
within the Declaration of Human Rights and its covenants (Justesen 
2003; Meron 1985; Olsen, Zarrehparvar, & Krusaa 2007; Skadegård 
2014). As such, it is a comprehensive, intersectional understanding 
that embraces identity parameters that merge within expressions of 
discrimination. Notwithstanding this, and as discussed further, in this 
study, structural discrimination is used here primarily in regard to 
racialised difference.1
Discrimination or Racism?
A distinction that should briefly be addressed here is my use of 
the term discrimination rather than racism and other related terms. 
This choice reflects several considerations. One of these is that 
discrimination refers to all internationally recognised discrimination 
grounds. The grounds are distinguished by way of their particular 
histories of oppressions and how these histories have influenced 
access and freedoms of affected groups in societies around the world 
(Justesen 2003; Meron 1985; Olsen, Zarrehparvar, Krusaa 2007). 
As such, discrimination embraces a complex of oppressed positions 
(and their intersections).
My main concern, however, in using discrimination rather than 
racism is to avoid a conflation of terms. Hooks, among others, has 
argued convincingly about the importance of accurately naming 
forms of discrimination and oppression in order to address and resist 
those (Hooks 2009). In accordance with this, I find that using racism 
and discrimination synonymously risks fudging distinctions between 
racism as ideological (which falls under freedom of thought) on the 
one hand and discrimination as an action with an impact, which is 
governable, e.g. through legal measures, on the other hand (Justesen 
2003). This distinction has its point of departure in the international 
human rights framework, which provides a normative, international 
understanding of discrimination. I see this distinction as useful in my 
aim for more precise identification (and resistance) of opaque and 
underlying forms of discrimination.
Additionally, because discrimination is an action or doing that 
negatively impacts targets, by looking at what happens (discrimination) 
rather than whether or not there is a racist intention, e.g., I hope to 
move focus towards identifying and naming the discrimination itself. 
I am interested in identifying how discrimination is enacted and how 
macro processes are inscribed in everyday actions, in other words, 
on what might be called a grey zone. By this, I mean a space that 
encompasses or describes micro-processes and interactions, or a 
micro-level, in which discrimination is enacted. It is in this space that 
there is a need to address and name forms of discrimination that 
remain difficult to identify, recognise and, most importantly, address.
In the following sections of this article, I identify and discuss two 
forms of structural discrimination in the empirical material, which I call 
micro-discrimination and benevolent discrimination.
Discrimination Seeps into Everyday Norms
Our marshmallow-puffs were called Negro-puffs for many years. 
Or Samba-puffs. A lot of kids still call them Negro-puffs and not 
marshmallow-puffs because their parents still call them that. 
What does that mean for our kids when we do that? Do the kids 
know what that means? For example, I didn’t know how a black 
Norwegian guy felt about the word until I said it and he said: ‘Lina, 
this is how it is, and so on. Have you thought about that?’ And 
I said ‘No, I haven’t.’ I mean of course I knew it was a negative 
word and that I shouldn’t use it, but I never thought I could set 
someone’s feelings off like that, or that it could make someone 
feel, y’know… less valued. (Lina)
In this interview excerpt, Lina explains that she knows the N-word 
(Negro) is somehow negative, it is also normalised by daily use 
because their parents still use this term. Words and concepts 
are used without (perhaps) considering their meaning and the 
consequences such language can have. She says that she does not 
fully understand what such language infers and how it set someone’s 
feelings off like that, or that it could make someone feel, y’know… 
less valued, until she is confronted and a target of such racialised 
terminology explains it to her. Interestingly, Lina herself is also 
racially minoritised. Despite this, she uses the term until she is taught 
otherwise. As such, this suggests that discriminatory structures 
are part of a shared frame of reference and uninterrogated norms, 
regardless of individual positions. As Gullestad (2005), among others, 
has discussed, this type of everyday racism resides in language and 
daily practices, reproducing discriminatory injury and naturalised 
perceptions of racial otherness when such language is used. In this 
way, structural discrimination enables witting and unwitting complicity 
and participation in discriminatory patterns.
Mogens describes a similar gesture in his reflection paper. 
Embedded notions of otherness seep into his assumptions about 
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racially minoritised persons in the following narrative. As depicted 
in the following passage, such underlying norms and perspectives 
influence his judgement and make him complicit in racially 
discriminatory assumptions.
After a training session in my club I noticed my telephone was 
missing. My first instinct was that if anyone from the club had 
taken it, it was probably Mansour. Later on I wondered just why I 
had assumed it was him (we actually have a good relationship). I 
arrived at the conclusion that, in addition to his economic situation 
(which I assume is not great, judging from my knowledge of his 
situation); it also had to do with being imprinted with general 
assumptions about folks with darker body markers and their 
willingness to appropriate other’s property. By the way, I found 
my phone on my desk when I got home. (Mogens)
Research on implicit bias, stereotypes and prejudice has illustrated 
how historical, underlying and implicit knowledge influences behaviour 
in such ways that ‘(...)come to influence perception and behavior - 
even when people do not personally endorse them and are motivated 
to be racially egalitarian’ (Goff et al. 2008: 305). Others show how 
the mere presence of minorities activates unconscious discriminatory 
responses (Dovidio, Kawakami & Gaertner 2002). This has also been 
shown to occur in Danish contexts (Hervik 2004).
Mogens’s story shows how, on the one hand, he responds 
reflexively, assuming that Mansour is the culprit. At the same time, he 
is aware that something is not quite right. Upon reflection, he explains 
that his unfair (albeit private) accusation rests on underlying, shared 
assumptions. He catches himself in an act of unwitting discrimination. 
The smiley he has placed at the end of his story suggests both 
a sense of irony and awareness of his folly, as well as perhaps 
pleasure at being able to catch himself in the act. It could also infer 
embarrassment or sheepishness at his reaction. Regardless, being 
able to catch the discriminatory reflex and reflect on it in this way 
illustrates well how discrimination can be deeply ingrained as well as 
not necessarily intentional.
Mogens’s reflections on this experience suggest that he does 
not wish to behave in a racially discriminatory fashion. As such, he 
exemplifies a paradox, or conflict between discriminatory behaviour 
and a desire not to discriminate, which has been described, among 
other places, in Sue’s (2010) work on microaggressions.
Sue discusses how racial discrimination resides within gestures 
and interactions and, as such, is hidden just under the surface, in 
assumptions and inferences that draw on shared norms. In the same 
way, Mogens discriminates without meaning to do so. Similar to Lina, 
he is caught unawares, so to speak, within norms and structures. 
He implies that his response is not an active choice, but a reflex, 
a mirroring of everyday norms – enacting acceptable or ordinary 
practice. His reflexive action mirrors structural discrimination 
as constitutive or productive in its influence on (not necessarily 
conscious) action.
When he thinks about the incident in retrospect, he sees the 
way in which he unwittingly or passively incorporates discriminatory 
assumptions in his own actions. This suggests, perhaps, the need 
for more active assessment of reflexive actions in the pursuit of anti-
discriminatory practice. As has been discussed in critical race and 
microaggression theory (Delgado & Stefancic 2001; Rowe 1990; 
Sue 2010), discrimination informs and influences everyday practice. 
Such implicit and underlying exclusion is neither direct nor easily 
identifiable. It is naturalised, occurring in a number of non-tangible 
ways. In such cases, a notion of structural discrimination provides a 
way to identify and address what is otherwise difficult to put a finger 
on. It is a framework to understand the normalisation of discriminatory 
perspectives, for instance as what I define as micro-discrimination in 
the following section.
Micro-discrimination
While much discrimination occurs in ways mirrored in the 
earlier narratives, it remains a common misperception that most 
discrimination is explicit, intentional and readily identified. This is 
one of the most important findings in the game-changing Stephen 
Lawrence Inquiry Report (SLR 1999). This UK inquiry, commissioned 
in connection with a marred police investigation of the murder of 
Stephen Lawrence, has had immense import in terms of identifying, 
recognising and acknowledging underlying and institutional racism 
and discrimination both in the UK and well beyond its borders. 
Furthermore, it has had a profound impact on legislation on racism 
and discrimination, as well as on race relations within the UK.
It describes what it calls unwitting racism as racism that
…can arise because of lack of understanding, ignorance or 
mistaken beliefs. It can arise from well-intentioned but patronizing 
words or actions. It can arise from unfamiliarity with the behavior 
or cultural traditions of people or families from minority ethnic 
communities. It can arise from racist stereotyping of black people 
as potential criminals or troublemakers. Often this arises out of 
uncritical self-understanding born out of an inflexible police ethos of 
the ‘traditional’ way of doing things. Furthermore such attitudes can 
thrive in a tightly knit community, so that there can be a collective 
failure to detect and to outlaw this breed of racism. The police 
canteen can too easily be its breeding ground (SLR 1999: 40).
In practice, as in Mogens’s and Lina’s examples (and as the SLR 
describes), much discrimination occurs unwittingly and without 
fanfare. Lina explains as follows:
…it’s like those small things you experience, I don’t think people 
mean it negatively, but somewhere or the other, under their 
surface, it’s there.(...) You aren’t equal, you feel that some times. 
You notice it in those little things.
As Lina says, it transpires implicitly, often underlying interactions with 
hidden or opaque messages (Bonilla-Silva 2010; Dovidio, Kawakami 
& Gaertner 2002; Essed 1991; Skadegård 2016).
Those targeted by discrimination are often challenged in the 
context of their resources and access and therefore are less easily able 
to resist or redress the discrimination they may experience. While this, 
of course, happens in explicit ways, such as organisational barriers in 
terms of jobs or promotions on the basis of race, gender-based wage 
differences, lack of representation in film, media or boardrooms, or 
other more explicit or institutional exclusion, discrimination also occurs 
discretely. A common way in which this happens is as naturalised 
beliefs, or what Rowe (1990) calls micro-inequities. This has also 
been defined in literature as microaggressions (Delgado & Stefancic 
2001; Sue 2010). I argue, however, that micro-discrimination is a more 
precise term for this type of underlying and implicit discrimination, as 
I elaborate in the following text.
To this day, when I tell someone that I am Danish, the normal 
reaction is ‘But where are you originally from? Are you adopted? 
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Where are your parents from?’ And even though questions like 
these have become normal for me, and even though I know that 
the people asking are just curious, it reminds me continuously 
that I am apparently not really Danish, even though I’ve never 
been anything but a Danish citizen!! (Jane)
As Jane suggests in her reflection paper, micro-discrimination is 
discrimination expressed in ways that lie just below the surface. The 
term is inspired by and encompasses the notion of microaggressions 
but refers specifically to the discrimination grounds. As such, micro-
discrimination is limited to, or refers to, the international discrimination 
framework. This specificity is intended in order to avoid conflation with 
other aggressions or forms of behaviour that may not necessarily be 
encompassed within discrimination.
Micro-discrimination can occur by way of normalised daily 
perceptions, such as assumptions about racialised belonging. In 
the earlier excerpt from her reflection paper, Jane describes being 
routinely refused her Danishness. Her answer is simply not accepted. 
Despite her own identification as Danish, she is still expected to 
explain herself. Her non-white appearance is seen as a contrast to 
Danishness rather than a possible Danishness. Such exchanges, 
which are described by all non-white Danes in the study, serve 
to emphasise and maintain the difference and shared notions of 
authentic belonging. Jane is addressed as though she is less entitled 
to define herself as Danish than if she had been racialised as a part 
of the white majority. As Jane says, it reminds [her] continuously that 
[she is] apparently not really Danish.
Such a contestation of identity draws on a widely shared 
assumption about Danishness as connected to whiteness (Andreassen 
2005; Myong 2009; Skadegård 2014). This small interaction is an 
arena in which a larger dynamic of racial discrimination is played 
out. This has also been described in other European contexts, which 
suggests a shared dynamic in regard to constructions of whiteness 
(Rastas 2005). It further suggests a position of normative authority, or 
what Spivak (1990) describes as sovereign subject, which legitimises 
rejecting Jane’s self-identification as a Dane, from a position claiming 
the authority to know better about real Danishness (knowing that 
Danishness is equivalent with whiteness). Mogens’ expectation that 
minoritised persons are potentially more criminal is also an example 
of micro-discrimination. The assumption draws on shared beliefs 
about whiteness, cloaked in discourses of ethnic difference, as has 
been described in Danish media research (Andreassen 2005; Yilmaz 
1999).
It is often more difficult to address micro-discrimination in 
seemingly minor everyday interactions, in which assumptions and 
expectations around difference engender discomfort, for instance, in 
the following interview excerpt:
But then, after I’d been there for like a month or something, we 
are sitting at the table with the secretaries and eating, and one 
secretary says to me, while all the lawyers are sitting around the 
table and eating, Sandra, it’s funny, I’ve noticed you never eat 
the meat here, is that because you are Muslim…? So there it 
was, y’know? And I was like, so it all happens super quick in 
my head, where I think: first I thought: You did not just ask me 
that right now, here?! That is, like, way out of proportion! And, 
how is it your business what I eat?! I mean, that is wild, if you 
hadn’t eaten tomatoes I would maybe have thought ok, so you 
don’t like tomatoes, and whatever, that’s your thing. I mean it’s 
a buffet, eat what you want. So I look at her, and there are all 
these things going on in my head at once: Should I just act like I 
don’t eat meat? That would be a lie, and I don’t want to do that, I 
don’t want to lie. Or should I look at her and tell her she’s out of 
line? And how can I do that without killing the mood – because 
people will be like ‘uh oh, we sure pressed the wrong button. She 
got pissed…’ That would be so awkward. So I looked at her and 
said ‘Naah’, and then I said, ‘But tell me, are you keeping an eye 
on what I eat?’ So then she was the one who was embarrassed, 
which I love because then I think ‘Good, you do have a bit of a 
conscience, and you do actually know what you can and can’t 
ask folk.’ So then she said that it wasn’t that she was keeping an 
eye on what I eat, she had just noticed it. But then she must have 
been keeping an eye, y’know? So I was like ‘no problem, don’t 
worry about it, you’re just asking’. (Sandra)
This incident illustrates some elements and challenges that arise 
within micro-discrimination. For example, while the secretary’s 
question may seem neutral, it communicates a particular perspective. 
Sandra’s appearance triggers a number of seemingly reflexive 
assumptions. Similar to the earlier scenario wherein Jane’s identity 
is directly contested, Sandra is also asked to explain herself, though 
the inference is a bit more subtle. In each instance, it seems that 
Sandra’s and Jane’s appearances spark a response. This can be read 
as a form of disruption by the non-white body, an issue that has been 
discussed in feminist and race theory. In an essay about happiness 
and affectivity, Ahmed (2010), drawing on Lorde and Hooks, among 
others, describes how the black female body engenders a discomfort 
by its mere presence in white feminist contexts. It seems that both 
Jane and Sandra affect their contexts similarly, and both must navigate 
against this framework. Jane responds without protest or resistance, 
which in Ahmed’s terms could be interpreted as acquiescing to 
oppression. Sandra, however, opts for an interesting way out, 
not quite as killjoy, but as something else. Prior to this incident, 
Sandra had not mentioned her religious background at work. This 
personal boundary is overstepped, or ignored, much like Jane’s own 
identification with Danishness. A power inequity is exposed where 
Sandra as the perceived other is expected to provide an explanation 
or divulge personal information in order to quell the secretary’s 
curiosity. Sandra’s discomfort appears to arise from an awareness of 
how she is constructed from a dominant perspective. As in Fanon’s 
(1967) description of being fixed or framed by the white gaze, Sandra 
is caught in a (violent) grip. Her body is assumed to be a fair target 
(and object) of purview and questioning. Her constructed difference 
is (over)emphasised when brought to attention while all the lawyers 
are sitting around the table and eating. Her body engenders certain 
assumptions and expectations that seem to legitimise a breach of 
her personal boundaries, something that, she infers, ordinarily would 
be a transgression of social codes. She is exposed and accosted. 
Private matters, such as religion and background, are made a public 
matter by way of a discussion of the food she has chosen from the 
buffet. The impropriety is subtle and lies in the awareness of what is 
assumed in the question.
Sandra, a Dane herself, is well aware of how non-white bodies 
are constructed and interpreted within the Danish context. Power is 
at play here both in regards to how her identity is perceived to require 
legitimising and explaining but also in the way that she is positioned in 
front of her colleagues. Sandra describes how she must think quick to 
navigate in this framework, ‘it all happens super quick in my head’. To 
think quickly in this situation is possibly to navigate in the awareness 
of its precariousness. If she is angry or defensive, as Ahmed (2010) 
describes, she may confirm the perception of angry black body, and 
if she is acquiescent, she submits to the oppression that underlies 
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this interchange. She resists the positioning by turning the situation 
around and taking an upper hand. In a subtle version of killing joy, as 
Ahmed might say, she resists by way of a twist of power. By calling the 
secretary out and asking if she is keeping an eye on what she eats, 
Sandra exposes the impropriety. Discomfort shifts to the secretary. The 
secretary’s embarrassment suggests that she is (or becomes) aware of 
the social breach. Repositioning also allows Sandra to avoid answering 
the question and regain some autonomy. In fact, it seems she is now 
in a situation where she has power, as emphasised by her being able 
to control and defuse the situation. She excuses the rudeness, saying 
‘don’t worry about it, you’re just asking’. This gesture puts Sandra in 
a position of authority to forgive a trespass of shared societal norms. 
One could ask whether Sandra would have done the same had it been 
one of the lawyers, who rank higher in the organisation, rather than the 
secretary. Clearly more than visible difference is at play here, these are 
murky waters. Sandra must navigate within the complex framework of 
gender, class, education, job hierarchy, social codes and her (possible) 
wish to remain an employee.
As these exchanges illustrate, micro-discrimination is often 
embedded within seemingly ordinary interactions. It is communicated 
in everyday practices, phrases or statements, often unwittingly, 
which expose structures of dominance, exclusion or non-belonging 
in relation to minorities. As one informant explains in his reflection 
paper, ‘It can happen in any number of ways, like being spoken to 
in English, which sounds banal, but is such a clear manifestation of 
being seen as not Danish. You aren’t read as Danish, and uh, I see 
you as foreign, you have less of a right to Danishness’ (Thomas). 
When discrimination occurs in these opaque and often unintentional 
ways, it becomes particularly difficult to address (Sue 2010). Not 
everyone has a manoeuvre like Sandra’s up their sleeve. Everyday 
shared notions of discrimination rarely include awareness of these 
nearly invisible types of discrimination. The language to address or 
redress, as well as the framework within which to identify it, is often 
lacking for both target and perpetrator in many Danish contexts. 
What is worse, however, is that this type of discrimination, because 
it is opaque and difficult to articulate, is also quite easily and readily 
denied. While explicit discrimination is something people generally 
both recognise and prefer to distance themselves from morally, subtle 
and underlying forms are unlikely to be acknowledged at all (Rowe 
1990; Sue 2010). Thus, addressing or contesting such opaque forms 
of discrimination is even more complicated.
Benevolent Discrimination – Pity the Victim
Another challenge that arises when discrimination is shrouded in 
everyday norms is seen within friendly and well-intended behaviour. 
While discrimination is often assumed to be connected with ill will or 
intent (Crump 1998–1999), as discussed earlier, this is not always the 
case. In the following section, I discuss how explicitly well-intended 
behaviour can also have discriminatory impact.
I think, for example, that because I didn’t go to a lot of those 
social events, that my teacher, uh, he had a kind of different 
attitude towards me. Uh, like, a relation like, we have to help her, 
we better save her from her parents and from herself. And that 
was one of the reasons that I, like I said before, that I had this 
tough attitude or kept a distance. Because no matter what, you’re 
always loyal to your parents and always loyal to your family, and 
nobody gets to come from the outside and say: I’m gonna save 
you from yourself, like… (Sandra)
In this narrative, actions and behaviours that on the surface seem 
positive and suggest concern – or even kindness –can be inflected 
with discriminatory dynamics. Sandra’s teacher wants to save her 
from her parents and from herself. Such a desire reflects several 
things. A desire to assist or rescue someone is generally considered 
a decent or noble thing. However, in this case, the impulse suggests 
very particular assumptions about the nature of Sandra’s life and 
family. The underlying expectation is that her religious background 
is problematic.2 Her family is assumed to be unable to provide 
appropriate parenting. Such a presumption may arise from either 
Sandra’s lower participation in certain extracurricular activities or 
from assumptions about her visible and religious difference, as well 
as how this may be construed by teachers. She is seen as deprived; 
as someone refused access to social activities. She must be saved. 
An asymmetry between minoritised bodies and majority positions 
is constructed such that the majority (as authoritative, sovereign 
subjectivity) is framed in terms of access, knowledge and freedom 
(lenient parenting and pedagogical insight), while minority parenting 
is constructed in opposition to this. Such assumptions, then, illustrate 
how a discriminatory gaze can be cloaked beneath, or even provide 
the impetus for, altruism.
As such, this resonates with historical conduct. That is, saviour 
discourses such as these, in which Sandra is seen as someone 
to be rescued, mirror certain colonial practices and structures. For 
example, narratives of benevolence were employed to condone 
slavery, religious indoctrination and the destruction of communities, 
languages, civilisations, skills, livelihoods and much more. These 
were considered, by dominant (colonising) powers, to be civilising 
processes. Those subject to such oppressions were perceived 
as primitive, uncivilised peoples. They were unfortunate/pagan/
helpless. Civilising the natives continues to be an undercurrent in 
contemporary interactions between majoritised (European/white) 
and minoritised positions. In addition, such modern narratives 
are often gendered. There is a tendency to see non-white women 
as particularly in need of rescue from perceived brown male 
counterparts. This white saviourism is captured in Spivak’s (1988) 
famous adage, ‘White men saving brown women from brown men’, 
which aptly describes the gesture of saving that Sandra describes 
when recounting her teacher’s attitude towards her. When Sandra 
suggests that her teacher shares in such a perspective, she makes 
explicit a common, perhaps sanctimonious, Danish theme in which 
the non-white – usually female – child is constructed as a victim.
Lina, another interviewee, describes how similar dynamics 
emerge during her school’s well-intended efforts to accommodate her 
pork-free diet. She recounts how peers responded to her lunches by 
expressing pity. Thus, comments such as ‘We feel sorry for you’ and 
‘Ooh, you don’t know what you are missing, it is so good!’ constructed 
her difference in a discourse of exclusion, lack and denial.
They made me feel like – the group that said it – that I wasn’t 
one of them. I think it was like that a lot until I was like 17 or 18, 
where I thought a lot about: ‘Why are they saying stuff like that?’ 
and ‘Lina you can’t have a boyfriend because you are a Muslim; 
geez, how can you even live with that?’ It was always about how 
my religion or culture was the reason I couldn’t do this or that. 
(Lina)
Lina is impacted by the tacit assumptions that surface in such 
exchanges. Her peers express that they feel sorry for her and see 
her as missing out and that she does not know what (she) is missing. 
Lina is constructed as someone who is denied the good things in 
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life. Her choices and possibilities (food, romantic choices) are a 
consequence of restrictions and denial. These are problematised and 
framed as illegitimate. She is interpreted, implicitly, as someone to be 
pitied. The underlying assumption is that the situation of her peers is 
decidedly superior to her own. While none of these exchanges are 
ill-intended or meant to be discriminatory, they do reveal a particular, 
dominant gaze similar to what Sandra describes in the previous 
narrative. A benevolent perspective constructs and positions them as 
less-advantaged, missing out and as victims of unreasonable social 
(religious) control.
I have always felt the difference. People seem to be expecting me 
to give them some kind of tabloid story. Like if I said something 
like ‘Yeah, I have been forced to marry my cousin, and I am a 
fanatic Muslim, and I can’t even look at you because you’re a 
boy. It’s like they are just waiting to hear that kind of thing, so they 
can see me as a victim… (Sandra)
Pity or empathy establishes the choices and lifestyles of Sandra’s 
and Lina’s families as subpar. The further assumption is that their 
peers are not subject to comparable social control or inappropriate 
parenting. Majority positions are framed in positive terms as having 
access to more benefits and goods (parties, school trips, sex, 
romance, and better food). Ethnocentric naturalisation of majority 
norms as superior situate Sandra and Lina within a benevolent 
narrative of lack and denial. Sandra and Lina are presumed to be 
subject to restrictions and social control. They are unfortunate, to be 
pitied and helped, but not equal.
Benevolent Discrimination – Don’t Look a Gift 
Horse….
Benevolence is complex and thickly layered with power. While 
immersed within good intentions and seemingly kind gestures, it 
infers a particular asymmetry between a (Western) patriarchal, 
charitable position, what Spivak (1990) calls benevolent subjectivity, 
directed towards a constructed, racialised other. The beneficiary is 
identified and defined as having less (or no) access or power (e.g. as 
being in need) from this empowered and entitled gaze.
The incidents discussed herein suggest that both confrontation 
and resistance are challenged when discrimination occurs in non-
antagonistic ways. In addition to the discomfort of being a killjoy, 
such discomfort may also be fed by other social codes and conflicting 
messages. When discrimination is widely believed to be intentional 
and antagonistic, how then, does the target address or even interpret 
the friendly or neutral interaction? When benevolence provides 
kindness or even help, how does a target address a marginalising 
gaze or negative assumptions and constructions? If, in an interaction 
where discrimination is veiled within kindness or even help, how does 
a target resist such benevolent discrimination without trespassing 
social codes and seeming ungrateful to those one might feel 
beholden to?
And I remember this always happening in my private school 
when we were out. And it wasn’t because they meant anything 
bad by it, but it just made one feel different. We just have to make 
sure Lina gets…. Of course it was considerate and well meant, 
but it just felt so – because the division happened the way it did. 
One felt a little like: ‘Hmm, well I am the “special” kid’. And I guess 
you could take it as positive, negative, whatever, but I think I felt a 
lot like: I just want to be like everyone else. Why do I have to feel 
like I’m different? (Lina)
Lina finds herself in a dilemma here. On the one hand, her school 
attends to her particular needs. On the other, because the division 
happened the way it did, she finds it uncomfortable. For Lina, the 
accommodation overemphasises her difference. In the process 
of framing itself as/behaving as chivalrous, Lina becomes cast as 
outsider, ‘Hmm, well I am the “special” kid.’ Lina asks, rhetorically, 
whether this is necessary. Could the school not have made less of 
a show and just naturalised the accommodation? I just want to be 
like everyone else. Why do I have to feel like I’m different? She is 
marginalised by way of a seemingly emphatic accommodation.
This presents a complicating factor. By providing help, assistance 
and support in a benevolent interaction, the question of one’s morality, 
goodness or intent to do good is made explicit or emphasised. That 
is to say, the benefactor is elevated within the moral framework 
of the beneficent behaviour. While this is very much the nature of 
philanthropy and charity and, as such, nothing new, it does contribute 
to the complexity and ambiguity of such relations and interchanges. 
An even more explicit rendition of this dynamic is provided by Jane in 
a narrative that surfaces in regard to her experience as transnationally 
adopted.
There was this time, we were on vacation, my sister and I weren’t 
very big. My Mom started chatting with a woman, who asked a few 
questions about us and stuff. My Mom told her we were adopted, 
and the woman was like ‘God, you are such good people – I 
mean she said this to my parents. Way out, you know? And then 
she asked this classic question: ‘Do they, like, live in the house?’ 
And that was really… Uhm, like to hear that as a child. I mean, 
like, yes we live in the house. What did she expect?! (Jane)
Here, Jane’s parents are viewed as such good people, while Jane and 
her sister seem barely to be seen as human. The woman asks their 
mother whether the children live in the house, which Jane describes 
as a classic question, suggesting that such inferences are not new to 
her in the course of such interchanges. Being seen as potentially not-
fit-to-live-in-the-house, Jane and her sister seem to be interpreted 
as stray animals, lucky to be fed and cared for, but not quite human 
or of equal status. The parents are benevolent, the children lucky. 
This type of benevolence discourse has been discussed at length in 
research on transnational adoption in Nordic contexts (Hübinette & 
Tigervall 2008; Myong 2009).
Benevolent discrimination constructs and maintains an 
asymmetric relation (Kapoor 2004; Spivak 1999). While benevolent 
subjectivity frames and defines the other as (per definition) deficient 
and in need, the benefactor is reified within an authoritative; all-
knowing space into which this constructed other can be invited to 
attain whatever it is seen to be lacking (Spivak 1990). Further, the 
well-intended (and genuine) benevolent gesture of helping, giving 
and empowering, among other things, makes it difficult to criticise 
the benevolent position.
Perspectives and Concluding Thoughts
In this article, I have looked at how discrimination, embedded in 
everyday interactions, can be hidden under a cloak of goodness and 
well-intended gestures. For some who experience discrimination 
in this way, it is a challenge to contest underlying and implicit 
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insinuations in a context where the individuals involved may mean 
no ill. If anything, they may mean well, yet their assumptions rest 
on discriminatory perspectives. Lina’s peers see themselves as 
having the right food, romance practices and so forth. The underlying 
expectation is that certain bodies, choices (food and romance) 
and freedoms (access to parties and school trips) exist within a 
backdrop of denial and control. A naturalised assumption holds 
that these racialised bodies are less fortunate, their parents less 
reasonable. Sandra is positioned as oppressed. Jane and her sister 
are beholden to parents who have saved them from an unknown, 
clearly deficient, fate. In these cases, challenging, addressing or 
rejecting discrimination becomes a dilemma fraught with discomfort. 
The recipient of this kindness (whether welcome or not) is placed in 
a position where they must navigate on tricky ground.
To discuss how such discrimination occurs, I have used structural 
discrimination as an overarching concept. I have also presented the 
terms micro-discrimination and benevolent discrimination as ways 
to access some of the dynamics in question. Micro-discrimination, 
which is closely connected to the notion of microaggressions, is 
subtle, underlying discrimination that occurs within everyday gestures 
of ordinary interaction. It refers only to discrimination and not to the 
wider notion of aggression. By using this concept, discrimination that 
is opaque or underlying can, potentially, be more readily identified and 
demarcated, e.g. when it occurs in seemingly friendly interchanges 
like benevolent discrimination.
The notion of benevolent discrimination, inspired by postcolonial 
theorist Spivak, is understood as a patriarchal and charitable attitude 
that constructs and maintains the ‘other’ from this perspective. This 
subjectivity seeks to bring the non-white non-Western other into its 
own (rational and right) understanding of the world, so to speak. 
The dynamic is framed as a form of giving and receiving (materially 
or symbolically) in which the minoritised body is positioned as 
beneficiary.
Benevolent discrimination occurs within seemingly positive and 
well-meaning gestures. It belies a relational dynamic that rests on 
powered assumptions (constructions of white Western and non-
white, non-Western difference). As such, the perspectives and actions 
manifested draw on inherited discriminatory legacies, or colonial 
residue, in the underlying assumptions about the beneficiary.
Further, the expectation of gratitude is pertinent. Unspoken 
tensions and internal conflict dwell within the spaces in which 
benefactor and recipient negotiate and interact. The beneficiary 
knows not to overstep the bounds of the interaction – for instance by 
criticising the benefactor. Implicit understandings of underlying rules 
make this issue a difficult ground to tread. When kindness engenders 
expectations of gratitude, one cannot easily or comfortably demand 
a more appropriate gesture or insist on a particular subjectivity. In the 
interaction, a hegemonic, dominant gaze (benevolent subjectivity) 
constructs and bestows what is deemed necessary to help minoritised 
persons or groups. The benefactor, individual or collective, defines 
and controls not only subjectivity by way of the gaze, but also through 
the help provided.
Micro-discrimination and benevolent discrimination can perhaps 
be said to be two sides of the same coin. Benevolent discrimination 
can occur in the form of micro-discrimination, and vice versa. 
Further, there is a certain acquiescence or tolerance in the situations 
in which these occur, because both forms require a bodily/intimate 
encounter or space of familiarity in order to fully manifest, although 
it can happen randomly, whether that is for a few hours at a dinner 
party, working together at school or in supportive or other ordinary, 
everyday interactions.
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Notes
1. I differentiate between structural and institutional discrimination. 
This distinction has been discussed in literature (Eckberg 1980; 
Henry et al. 1995; Pincus 1996; hill 1989; Williams, RM 1988), 
yet they are often used synonymously.
2. In these examples, factors such as religion, race, gender 
and so on are complex parameters that contribute to racial 
discrimination. While religion is not necessarily always racialised, 
in these cases, religion and race overlap.
References
Ahmed, S 2010, ‘Killing joy: feminism and the history of happiness’, 
Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society, vol. 35, no. 3, 
pp. 571-594, DOI:10.1086/648513.
Andreassen, R 2005, The mass media’s construction of gender, 
race, sexuality and nationality: an analysis of the Danish news 
media’s communication about visible minorities, University of 
Toronto, Toronto.
Andreassen, R & Rabo, A 2014, ‘The Nordic discomfort with race’, 
Nordic Journal of Migration Research, vol. 4, no. 1, pp. 42-44, 
DOI:10.2478/njmr-2014-0004.
Atkinson, R & Flint, J 2001, ‘Accessing hidden and hard to reach 
populations: snowball research strategies’, Social Research 
Update, vol. 33.1, pp. 1-4.
Bonilla-Silva, E 2010, Racism without racists, color-blind racism & 
racial inequality in contemporary America, Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishers, Inc, Plymouth.
Bulmer, M & Solomos, J 2004, Researching race and racisms, 
Routledge, London.
Crenshaw, K 1991, ‘Mapping the margins: intersectionality, identity 
politics, and violence against women of color’, Stanford Law 
Review, vol. 43, no. 6, pp. 1241-1299, DOI:10.2307/1229039.
Crump, D 1998-1999, ‘Evidence, race, intent, and evil: the paradox 
of purposelessness in the constitutional racial discrimination 
cases’, Hofstra Law Review, vol. 27, no. 2, Article 2.
Danbolt, M & Raun, T 2008, ‘Hornsleths un/fair trade - æstetisk 
evangelisme og nykolonialistisk etnografi i samtidskunsten’, 
Kvinder, Køn og Forskning, vol. 4, pp. 23-37.
221
Delgado, R & Stefancic, J 1992, ‘Images of the outsider in American 
law and culture: can free expression remedy systematic social 
ills?’ Cornell Law Review, vol. 77, pp. 1258-1297.
Delgado, R & Stefancic, J 2001, Critical race theory, an introduction, 
New York University Press, NY.
Dovidio, JF, Kawakami, K & Gaertner, SL 2002, ‘Implicit and explicit 
prejudice and interracial interaction’, Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, vol. 82, pp. 62-68. DOI:10.1037/0022-
3514.82.1.62.
Eckberg, JR 1980, ‘Discrimination: motivation, action, effects, and 
context’, Annual Review of Sociology, vol. 6, pp. 1-20.
Essed, P 1991, Understanding everyday racism, an interdisciplinary 
theory, SAGE Publications, Newbury Park, CA.
Fanon, F 1967, Black skin, white masks, Pluto Press, UK.
Goff, PA, Eberhardt, JL, Williams, MJ & Jackson, MC 2008, ‘Not 
yet human: implicit knowledge, historical dehumanization, and 
contemporary consequences’, Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, vol. 94, no. 2, pp. 292-306, DOI:10.1037/0022-
3514.94.2.292.
Gullestad, M 2004, ‘Blind slaves of our prejudices: debating ‘culture’ 
and ‘race’ in Norway’, Ethnos: Journal of Anthropology, vol. 69, 
no. 2, pp. 177-203, DOI:10.1080/0014184042000212858.
Gullestad, M 2005, ‘Normalising racial boundaries. The Norwegian 
dispute about the term Neger’, Social Anthropology, vol. 13, no. 
1, pp. 27-46, DOI:10.1017/S0964028204000850.
Henry, F, Tator, C, Mattis, W & Rees, T 1995, The colour of 
democracy: racism in Canadian society, Harcourt Brace & Co., 
Toronto, Canada.
Hervik, P 2004, ‘The Danish cultural world of unbridgeable differences’, 
Ethnos, pp. 247-267, DOI:10.1080/0014184042000212885.
Hill, RB 1988, ‘The unintended consequences of institutional 
processes’ in Surveying social life, papers in honor of Herbert H. 
Hyman, Wesleyan University Press, Middletown.
Hooks, B 2009, Writing beyond race: living theory and practice, 
Routledge, London.
Hübinette, T & Tigervall, C 2008, Adoption med förhinder: samtal 
med adopterade och adoptivföräldrar om vardagsrasism och 
etnisk identitet, Mångkulturellt Centrum.
Jensen, L 2012, ‘Danishness as whiteness in crisis: emerging post-
imperial and development aid anxieties’ in Whiteness and 
postcolonialism in the Nordic region: exceptionalism, migrants, 
others, and national identities, Routledge, London, pp. 105-118.
Justesen, P 2003, Racisme og diskrimination - Danmark og 
menneskerettighederne, Akademisk Forlag, Copenhagen.
Kamali, M 2009, Racial discrimination: institutional patterns and 
politics, Routledge, London.
Kapoor, I 2004, ‘Hyper-self-reflexive development? Spivak on 
representing the third world ‘other’, Third World Quarterly, vol. 
25, no. 4, pp. 627-647, DOI:10.1080/01436590410001678898.
Keskinen, S 2012, ‘Limits to speech? The racialized politics of 
gendered violence in Denmark and Finland’, Journal of 
Intercultural Studies, vol. 33, no. 3, June, pp. 261-274, DOI:10.1
080/07256868.2012.673470.
Kilomba, G 2013, Plantation memories, episodes of everyday racism, 
Unrast Verlag, Münster.
Meron, T 1985, ‘The meaning and reach of the international 
convention on the elimination of all forms of racial discrimination’, 
The American Journal of International Law, vol. 79, no. 2, pp. 
283-318, DOI:10.2307/2201704.
Myong, LM 2009, Adopteret - fortællinger om transnational og 
racialiseret tilblivelse, Århus Universitet, Århus.
Olsen, BK, Zarrehparvar, M & Krusaa NM 2007, Effektiv beskyttelse 
mod diskrimination - om retlige og faktiske tiltag, udreding nr.5, 
Institut For Menneskerettigheder, Copenhagen.
Pincus, FL 1996, ‘Discrimination comes in many forms, individual, 
institutional, and structural’, The American Behavioral Scientist, 
vol. 40, no. 2, pp. 186-194, DOI:10.1177/00027642960400020
09.
Rasmussen, KS 2011, ‘Foucault’s genealogy of racism,’ Theory, Culture 
and Society, pp. 34-51, DOI:10.1177/0263276411410448
Rastas, A 2005, ‘Racializing categorization among young people in 
Finland’, Young, DOI:10.1177/1103308805051319.
Reyes, PDL & Kamali, M 2005, ‘Det blågula glashuset – strukturell 
diskriminering i Sverige’, Statens Offentliga Utredningar (SOU), 
nr. 56.
Rowe, MP 1990, ‘Barriers to equality: the power of subtle discrimination 
to maintain unequal opportunity’, Employees Responsibilities 
and Rights Journal, June, Vol. 3, pp. 153-163.
Skadegård, M 2014, ‘Strukturel diskrimination i hverdagen’ in 
Rettigheder, empowerment og læring, Annette Bilfeldt, Iben 
Jensen & John Andersen (Ed.) pp. 160-183, Aalborg University 
Press, Aalborg.
Skadegård, MC 2016, ‘Sand negro’ in Social eksklusion, læring og 
forandring, Annette Bilfeldt, Iben Jensen & John Andersen (Ed.) 
pp. 168-182, Aalborg University Press, Aalborg.
SLR, 1999, ‘The Stephen Lawrence inquiry report of an inquiry Dr 
Richard Stone,’ Presented to Parliament by the Secretary of 
State for the Home Department by Command of Her Majesty, 
London.
Spivak, GC 1988, ‘Can the subaltern speak’ in Marxism and the 
interpretation of culture, C. Nelson & L. Grossberg (Eds.), pp. 
271-313, University of Illinois Press, Illinois.
Spivak, GC 1990, The post-colonial critic, Routledge, NY.
Spivak, GC 1999, A critique of postcolonial reason, toward a history 
of the vanishing present, Harvard, Boston.
Sue, DW 2010, Microaggressions and marginality, manifestation, 
dynamics, and impact, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., Hoboken.
Trienekens, S & Essed, P 2008, ‘Who wants to feel white?’ race, Dutch 
culture and contested identities’, Ethnic and Racial Studies, vol. 
31, no. 1, pp. 52-72, DOI:10.1080/01419870701538885.
Urciuoli, B 2013, Exposing prejudice: Puerto Rican experiences of 
language, race, and class, Waveland Press, Long Grove.
222
Williams, RM 1988, ‘Racial attitudes and behavior’ in Surveying social 
life, papers in honor of Herbert H. Hyman, Hubert J. O’Gorman, 
Ed., pp. 331-351, Wesleyan University Press, Middletown.
Yilmaz, F 1999, ‘Konstruktionen af de etniske minoriteter; eliten, 
medierne og ”etnificeringen” af den danske debat’, Politica 
Tidsskrift, vol. 31, no. 2, pp. 178-191.
223
